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1 Introduction
Like any regulatory mechanism, the patent system has benefits and costs, both private
and social. Yet little empirical evidence exists about the magnitude of some of these costs,
leaving policy analysts to sometimes rely on guesswork. For example, recent policy analysis of a
patent opposition proceeding in the US (Levin and Levin 2002, Hall et al. 2004) has been based
on rough estimates of the costs of patent litigation and the social costs of inappropriately-granted
patents.
In contrast, there is a significant literature estimating benefits of the patent system,
especially private benefits in the form of estimates of patent value1 or of the patent premium
(Arora et al. 2005). However, without comparable estimates of private and social costs, it is
difficult to conduct either analysis of specific policy changes or a normative analysis of the
patent system in comparison to other means of encouraging innovation. For example,
Schankerman (1998) suggests that the ratio of aggregate patent value to R&D constitutes an
upper bound measure of the subsidy that patents provide to R&D. He asserts that this ratio can be
used to compare patents to other forms of appropriating returns on invention. But surely this is
only an estimate of a gross subsidy against which private costs of patents need to be netted out.
This paper takes a step toward quantifying costs by estimating the private costs of patent
litigation. Using event study methodology to analyze patent lawsuit filing we find the expected
joint loss to the litigating parties is large, and probably much larger than the expected attorneys’
fees. This result is a bit of a surprise because most patent lawsuits settle short of trial, and thus it
might seem that average patent litigation costs would not be large.
But attorneys’ fees can be high even when a patent lawsuit settles before trial, and the
indirect costs of litigation can also be high before trial. Indirect business costs of patent litigation
take many forms. Business can be disrupted as managers and researchers spend their time
producing documents, testifying in depositions, strategizing with lawyers, and appearing in court.
Litigation strains the relationship between the two parties and may jeopardize cooperative
development of the patented technology or cooperation on some other front. Firms in a weak
financial position might see their credit costs soar because of possible bankruptcy risk created by
patent litigation.
Alleged infringers face additional costs. Preliminary injunctions can shut down
production and sales while the litigation pends. But even without a preliminary injunction,
customers may stop buying a product. Frequently, products require customers to make
1This literature began with Pakes and Schankerman (1984). See Bessen (2008) for a survey of this literature.
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complementary investments; they may not be willing to make these investments if a lawsuit
poses some risk that the product will be withdrawn from the market. Furthermore, patent owners
can threaten customers and suppliers with patent lawsuits because patent infringement extends to
every party who makes, uses, or sells a patented technology without permission, and sometimes
to those who participate indirectly in the infringement. Some of these costs persist after
settlement.
Even simple delay can impose large business costs. Consider, for example, litigation
against Cyrix, a startup firm that introduced Intel-compatible microprocessors. Intel, the
dominant microprocessor maker, sued Cyrix and the suit lasted a year and a half. During that
time Cyrix had difficulty selling microprocessors to computer manufacturers, who were almost
all also customers of Intel and who were reluctant to break ranks to go with a product that might
be found to infringe. In the meantime, Intel responded by accelerating its development of chips
that would compete against Cyrix’s offerings. In the end, Cyrix won the lawsuit, but lost the war,
having lost much of its competitive advantage. In effect, Cyrix lost the window of opportunity to
establish itself in the marketplace. Litigation exacted a heavy toll indeed.
Although we explore the costs of litigation to both patent owners and alleged infringers
in some detail, our chief interest is with the cost to alleged infringers. We choose this focus
because innovators experience the patent system both as patent owners and as alleged infringers.
Empirical methods that measure patent value by studying patent renewal or stock market
valuation of patent portfolios account for the expected cost of enforcing patents through
litigation.2 Unfortunately, there are no studies that quantify the negative impact of patent
litigation cost on alleged infringers.
To the extent that costly patent litigation is mainly the result of inadvertent infringement
—and we argue elsewhere that it is (Bessen and Meurer 2005, 2006, 2008)—then the costs of
defending against inadvertent infringement represent a disincentive to investing in innovation.3
The risk of unavoidable infringement acts like a “tax” on innovation. We fear this tax has grown
in recent years because we found that during the 1990s there was a dramatic increase in the
hazard of patent litigation for publicly traded firms (Bessen and Meurer 2005).
The event study methodology has been used before to study litigation, beginning with
Cutler and Summers (1988) in the context of litigation over a merger. Several papers have
2 Nevertheless, it is useful to know how much patent value is eaten away by patent litigation, and what sort of reforms
might reduce patent enforcement costs. Answers to those questions will have to wait for future research.
3 These costs include the deadweight losses described above and also the settlement transfer from an innocent
innovator/infringer to the patent owner.
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performed event studies of patent litigation, both the event of the initial filing and the terminating
event (settlement, judgment or verdict), including Bhagat, et al. (1994), Lerner (1995), Bhagat et
al. (1998), Lunney (2004) and Haslem (2005).
These studies of initial filings, however, do not provide the best estimates from which to
calculate the aggregate risk of infringement to the firms that perform R&D. They use small,
selective samples and their estimates of wealth loss are not especially precise. Our contribution is
to work with a much larger set of disputes: our sample covers most patent lawsuits filed against
US public firms from 1984 through 1999, a sample responsible for the lion’s share of R&D
spending. This gives our results greater precision and also makes them highly representative of
R&D-performing firms, permitting us to calculate a variety of cost and risk measures to inform
policy. We find, in fact, that the estimates of wealth loss reported in some earlier studies appear
to be overstated.
A key assumption of this literature is that the change in firm value that occurs around a
lawsuit filing reflects investors’ estimates of the direct and indirect effects of the lawsuit on the
profits of the firm on average and do not systematically reflect any unrelated information. We
show evidence below that the revelation of unrelated information does not overstate our
estimates for defendants in infringement suits and that, therefore, we may associate the loss in
wealth with the effective total cost of litigation for defendants.
We find that alleged infringers lose about half a percentage point of their stock market
value upon being sued for patent infringement. This corresponds to a mean cost of $28.7 million
in 1992 dollars (median of $2.9 million), much larger than mean legal fees of about half a
million. In aggregate, infringement risk rose sharply during the late 1990s, exceeding $16 billion
for US public firms. This amounts to 19% of these firms’ R&D spending, a ratio that exceeds
some estimates of the value of patents granted relative to R&D.
The next section describes the data and methods used for estimating cumulative
abnormal returns. Section 3 reports average returns and some analysis of factors that affect
returns. Section 4 calculates litigation cost, Section 5 calculates some broader measures of
infringement risk and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data Sources
Our research matches records from three data sources: lawsuit filings from Derwent’s
Litalert database, firm financial data from Compustat, and CRSP data on securities prices. In
addition, we searched the electronic archives of the Wall Street Journal to locate any articles
announcing lawsuit filings and also any announcements of other events that might confound our
analysis.
Using these sources, we constructed two main samples. The first, small sample included
just those lawsuits where we could identify one or more parties on both sides of the dispute as
public firms. The second, large sample included all cases where the alleged infringer (defendant
in an infringement suit or plaintiff in a declaratory action) was a publicly traded firm, but the
patentee litigant need not be public.
Our primary source of information on lawsuit filings is Derwent’s Litalert database, a
database that has been used by several previous researchers (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004,
Ziedonis, 2004, Bessen and Meurer 2005). Federal courts are required to report all lawsuits filed
that involve patents to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Derwent’s data is
based on these filings. Beginning with the Derwent data from 1984 through 2000, we removed
duplicate records involving the same lawsuit as identified by Derwent’s cross-reference fields.
We also removed lawsuits filed on the same day, with the same docket number and involving the
same primary patent. Sometimes firms respond to lawsuits by filing counter-suits of their own,
perhaps involving other patents. Since our main focus is on initial disputes rather than on lawsuit
filings per se, we also removed filings made within 90 days of a given suit that involved the same
parties.
The Derwent data does not distinguish whether the suit filed is an infringement suit or a
declaratory judgment suit. A firm threatened with an infringement suit can file a declaratory
action which aims for a judgment that the patent is uninfringed or invalid. To classify each suit,
we first identified whether the patent assignee of the main patent at issue matched one of the
parties to the suit. If the assignee matched a plaintiff, the suit was classified as an infringement
suit; if the assignee matched a defendant, the suit was classified as a declaratory action. We were
able to match the assignee for 83% of the suits, and of these, only 17% were declaratory actions.4
4 These numbers are quite similar to findings by Moore (2000) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
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If the assignee did not match a party to the suit, then it was classified as an infringement suit
because there are relatively few declaratory actions. This classification then allowed us to
identify whether the subject firm was a “patentee litigant” (that is, plaintiff in an infringement
suit or defendant in a declaratory action) or an “alleged infringer” (the reverse).
To explore characteristics of firms involved in these lawsuits, we matched the listed
plaintiffs and defendants to the Compustat database of U.S. firms from 1984-99 that report
financials (excluding American Depository Receipts of foreign firms traded on US exchanges).
These data were based on merged historical data tapes from Compustat and involved an
extensive process of tracking firms through various types of re-organization and eliminating
duplicate records for firms (e.g., consolidated subsidiaries listed separately from their parent
companies).5
The lawsuit data were matched to the Compustat data by comparing the litigant names
with all domestic firm names in Compustat and also a list of subsidiary names used in Bessen
and Hunt (2007).6 To check the validity and coverage of this match, we randomly selected a
number of parties to suits and then checked them manually using various databases including
PACER, LexisNexis, the Directory of Corporate Affiliations and the LexisNexis M&A
databases. Although we were not able to definitively identify all parties, the rate of false
positives was not more than 3% (no more than 5 of 165 parties were found to have been falsely
matched) and the rate of false negatives was no more than 7% (no more than 34 of 502 public
companies were not matched). The Compustat firms were then also matched to the CRSP file of
daily security prices.
We identified 2,648 suits with sufficient data on alleged infringers, some of these having
multiple alleged infringers, for a total of 2,887 events in our large sample. We also selected all
those lawsuits where we could identify at least one party on each side as a publicly listed firm.
This left us with asample of 750 plaintiffs and 747 defendants in lawsuits where public firms
were parties on both sides.
Summary statistics of our samples are shown in Table 1 and further details from a
closely related sample are reported in Bessen and Meurer (2005). Parties to patent lawsuits tend
to be larger than average firms with large R&D budgets. Moreover, our large sample captures the
5 This work was conducted by Bob Hunt and Annette Fratantaro at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia for an

earlier project and we thank them for graciously sharing it with us.
6 A software program identified and scored likely name matches, taking into account spelling errors, abbreviations, and

common alternatives for legal forms of organization. These were then manually reviewed and accepted or rejected.
Note that this match is based on the actual parties to litigation, not the original assignee of the patent at issue.
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bulk of patent litigation against R&D performers. In 1999, US public firms in Compustat spent
$150 billion on R&D, while total industrial R&D spending reported by the National Science
Foundation was $160 billion.7 Aside from issues of under-reporting, our large sample constitutes
a comprehensive sample with which we can obtain a lower bound measure of the aggregate risk
of infringement to R&D performers.
Finally, each lawsuit in the small sample was checked against the Wall Street Journal
archive to identify those suits that were announced in the Journal within one month of the filing
data and to identify possible confounding news about either party to the suit within one week of
the filing date.
In Section 4 we discuss a supplemental dataset of lawsuits that reports legal fees.

2.2 Estimating Cumulative Abnormal Returns
To estimate the impact of a lawsuit filing on the value of a firm, we use event study
methodology (see Mackinlay 1997 for a review). In particular, we use the dummy variable
method described by Michael Salinger (1992).8 This assumes that stock returns follow a market
model,
(1)

m

rt

rt

t

m

where rt is the return on a particular stock at time t, rt is the compounded return on a market
portfolio, and

t

is a stochastic error. If an event, such as a lawsuit filing, occurs on day T, then

there may be an “abnormal return” to the particular stock on that day. This can be captured using
a dummy variable,
(2)

rt

m

rt

It

t

where It equals 1 if t=T and 0 otherwise. Equation (2) can be estimated using OLS for a single
event. In practice, this equation is estimated over the event period and also over a sufficiently
long pre-event window. In this paper we use a 200 trading-day pre-event window.9 The
7 There are important differences in the scope of what was included in these two measures, nevertheless, they suggest
that public firms account for the lion’s share of R&D spending.
8 Salinger shows that this model is mathematically equivalent to the OLS market model described in Brown and
Warner (1985) and widely used.
9 We also ran regressions with a 180 day pre-event window that ended 30 days before the lawsuit filing. Cumulative
abnormal returns were very close to those with a 200 day window that last up to the day before the event window.
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coefficient estimate of δ obtained by this procedure is then an estimate of the abnormal return on
this particular stock. For different stocks, the precision of the estimates of will vary depending
on how well equation (2) fits the data. The estimated coefficient variance from the regression
provides a measure of the precision of the estimate of the abnormal return.
We want to obtain a representative estimate of the abnormal returns from lawsuit filings
for multiple stocks, under the assumption that these represent independent events and that they
share the same underlying “true” mean. Previous papers estimating abnormal returns from patent
lawsuits have simply reported unweighted means for the group of firms. Although the
unweighted mean is an unbiased estimator, it is not efficient. Since we are concerned with
obtaining the best estimate to use in policy calculations (and not just testing the sign of the
mean), we use a weighted mean to estimate the “average abnormal return,” where the weight for
each observation is proportional to the inverse of the variance of the estimate of δ for that firm.10
When we test our means against the null hypothesis that the true mean is zero, we report
both the significance of t-tests using the weighted mean and also the significance of the Z
statistic (see Dodd and Warner 1983), a widely used parametric test of significance that
incorporates the variation in precision across events.11 In any case, the significance test results
are closely similar as are those of some non-parametric tests.
As Salinger (1992) notes, this procedure assumes that the returns for each event are
independent of each other. However, when there are multiple defendants in a suit, returns may be
systematically related. For example, one defendant may be a supplier to another or two
defendants may be unequal rivals. Since the large sample has 188 lawsuits with multiple
defendants, in these cases we estimate the returns for the defendants to each suit jointly,
estimating common abnormal returns for this group of defendants.
Finally, (2) describes the abnormal return for a single day. It is straightforward to design
dummy variables to estimate a “cumulative abnormal return” (CAR) over an event window
consisting of multiple consecutive days. In the following, for instance, if the suit is filed on date
t=T, then we may use a window from day T-1 to T+24.

10 In any case, we find that for our entire sample, the weighted mean is quite close to the unweighted mean and also to

the median. However, there are significant differences in the averages for sub-samples.
11 The Z statistic is a joint test of the individual firm t-tests. We use a robust version described in Kramer (2001).
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2.3 The Event
This paper also differs from previous research in the nature of the events we study.
Previous studies have used the announcement of the lawsuit in a newspaper or wire service as the
event. We use the filing of the lawsuit, instead. This may seem to be a minor difference, but it is
significant for two reasons.
First, at the time of our sample, most patent lawsuits were not announced in newspapers
or wire service reports at all. Various factors may influence whether a lawsuit is announced or
not. Firms may choose to issue a press release or not. The SEC requires reporting of major
lawsuits in quarterly and annual filings, but lawsuits will be reported separately only if they
materially affect the profits of the firm. And news sources may not report all lawsuits even if the
firms issue press releases.
We took a random sample of patent lawsuits against US public firms and searched
LexisNexis for news stories that mention the lawsuits within one month of the filing date, before
and after. We found that only 19% of the lawsuits were mentioned in the Dow Jones Newswire,
one of the most comprehensive reporting services; only 7% were mentioned in the Wall Street
Journal, which was used by several of the previous studies. Since one of our objectives is to tally
the combined risk of lawsuits for public firms, clearly we cannot obtain comprehensive estimates
relying only on announced lawsuits.
Moreover, announced lawsuits are a select group that may be qualitatively different from
other lawsuits. That is, samples of announced lawsuits may suffer from sample selection bias. To
test this, we performed a series of Probit regressions in our small sample on whether a lawsuit
was reported in the Wall Street Journal (see Appendix). Among other things, we find that the
probability of a Wall Street Journal announcement is strongly correlated with the defendant
firm’s stock market beta. This might reflect the editorial judgment of the Wall Street Journal that
certain lawsuits are more newsworthy and more likely to affect a defendant’s stock price or,
perhaps, word of the lawsuit is already affecting the defendant’s stock price. This, in turn,
suggests that estimates made on a sample of announced lawsuits may have abnormal returns with
a larger absolute magnitude than those from a more representative sample.
Below we compare estimates of abnormal returns from samples of lawsuits announced in
the Wall Street Journal with estimates from our comprehensive sample. We find that our
estimates from the announced sample are quite similar to those reported in the previous
literature. However, these estimates are substantially larger in absolute magnitude than those for
our comprehensive sample, suggesting considerable sample selection bias.
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On the other hand, our estimates may be understated for another reason: investors may
not receive news of the lawsuit within an event window around a filing date. With an
announcement in a newspaper or major newswire, we can be reasonably sure that investors hear
the news of the lawsuit within a day or two of the announcement. But we cannot be sure that
investors hear the news about a legal filing in a district courthouse. Indeed, depending on how
long it takes to serve papers, the defendant may not be aware of the lawsuit for a day or so after
the filing date. In other words, news of an unannounced patent lawsuit filing may leak out more
slowly and investors may not learn of a lawsuit within a specified event window.
We see evidence of this slower diffusion of information in the lawsuits that were
announced in the Wall Street Journal. Figure 1 displays the frequency of these news stories
relative to the actual court filing date. Event studies based on public announcements typically use
an event window of two or three days (often one day before the announcement). Although many
lawsuits are announced within two days of filing, such a small event window around a filing date
would clearly miss a very large share of lawsuit announcements. Moreover, it seems likely (given
the role of stock market beta in the likelihood of a Wall Street Journal article) that the lawsuits
that are announced within a few days of the filing may be qualitatively different from those for
which the news leaks out more slowly and are either announced later or not announced at all.
Indeed, we find evidence within our data that stocks with beta above 1 react to the filing faster
than lower beta stocks.12 In order to have representative and comprehensive estimates, we use a
longer event window than would be appropriate in an announcement event study. Specifically,
we use a 25 day window (from T-1 to T+24), which, based on the data in Figure 1, should
capture 96% of the announced events and, we hope, a large share of the unannounced filings. We
show some CARs from shorter windows in the Appendix.
There are two possible concerns with such a longer window. First, the longer window
introduces more “noise” into the estimation reducing precision and possibly attenuating the
estimates. Because we have a much larger sample size than earlier studies, this is not such a
significant concern and our estimates are reasonably precise, although they may be slightly
attenuated. Second, research on long horizon event studies—that is, studies with multi-year event
windows—find certain biases that arise for a variety of reasons (Barber and Lyon 1997, Kothari

12 At day 2, the higher beta stocks for defendant firms have a CAR that is significantly lower than the CAR for lower

beta stocks (at the 5% level) and the lower beta CAR is not significantly different from zero. At day 24, the CARs for
these two groups are not significantly different and both are significantly different from zero. One explanation for the
faster speed of diffusion for high beta stocks is that the opportunities for investors to make returns from the information
about the lawsuit filing are relatively greater for these stocks.
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and Warner 1997).13 However, it seems highly unlikely that these concerns can exert a
substantially greater influence in a 25 day window than they exert in a three day window.
In summary, restricting the study to events announced in news services likely introduces
substantial sample selection bias. Our estimates, based on a larger window following the filing of
the lawsuit, are smaller, although they might be biased toward zero.

3 Empirical Findings
3.1 Estimates of cumulative abnormal returns
Since previous studies have used samples where parties on both sides of a lawsuit were
public firms and the suits were reported to newspapers or wire services, we begin by exploring a
sub-sample. Table 2 shows estimates of cumulative abnormal returns for just those suits from our
small, matched sample that were reported in the Wall Street Journal. In this table, we exclude
suits that had a potentially confounding news story in the Wall Street Journal within a month of
the suit filing date. Two previous studies have reported on event study estimates on
announcements of patent lawsuits filings. Bhagat et al. (1998) examine lawsuits filed between
1981 and 1983 (51 plaintiffs and 33 defendants) and Lerner (1995) obtains estimates for 26
biotech lawsuits from 1980 to 1992.14 To maintain consistency with the previous literature, in
this Table (but not in the next) we report simple unweighted means of cumulative abnormal
returns.15 The mean and median values are reported for two different event windows, one around
the Wall Street Journal publication date, the other a longer window around the actual suit filing
date reported in court records (these dates occasionally differed significantly).
Consistent with most of the previous literature on litigation, we find that patentee
litigants do not show a positive response to a lawsuit filing. Bhagat et al. (1998) report a CAR of
-0.31%, and we find a similar value. For defendants (alleged infringers), we find a substantial
loss in market value of around 2%. Bhagat et al. report a loss of 1.50%. For the combined loss of
wealth, we find a mean of 2.5-2.6%, although smaller median values. Bhagat et al. (1994) report
a mean loss of 3.13% and Lerner (1995) reports a mean loss of 2.0%. All three results are
13 These reasons include: 1.) with a long window, the composition of the market index may change with the addition

of new entrants or from rebalancing, 2.) compounding of returns leads to a highly skewed distribution, 3.) not all firms
survive to the end of a long event window, and, 4.) the market model or its variance may change or may be sensitive to
specification errors over long windows. We find that our measured returns are not highly skewed and there are few
cases of firms failing to survive the event window.
14 Bhagat et al. (1998) includes the data from the Bhagat et al. 1994 paper, so we do not list that separately. Lerner

searched the Wall Street Journal as well as news wire services for announcements. The other studies just used articles
in the Wall Street Journal.
15 For this reason, this table does not report standard errors or significance tests.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=983736

12 – Patent Litigation Costs - Bessen & Meurer – 2/08
broadly similar and quite substantial. Lerner reports a mean absolute loss of shareholder wealth
of $67.9 million, a median loss of $20.0 million. In general, there does not appear to be a major
difference between the results reported in the event window around the Wall Street Journal
publication date and the longer window around the filing date.
As noted above, estimates for this sub-sample may be unrepresentative of most patent
litigation, however, because most lawsuits are not reported in the Wall Street Journal. Table 3
reports cumulative abnormal returns for all lawsuits in the matched sample (top) as well as those
for the large sample (bottom). The base result for the matched sample uses a 25 day event
window (T-1 to T+24) and excludes possibly confounding events. The table also reports CARs
for suits that were positively identified as infringement suits (that is, the plaintiff was the patent
assignee), and for a sample that included lawsuits with possibly confounding news events. The
reported means and standard errors use weights based on the variance of the dummy variable
coefficient in the event regression. Several results stand out.
First, the estimated percentage losses for alleged infringers are substantially less than
those for lawsuits reported in the Wall Street Journal in Table 2. We cannot tell, however,
whether the percentage loss estimates in the Journal are larger because of a selection effect or
because of the greater information conveyed by publication in the Journal. Even though some
learning takes place, we suspect that in most lawsuits, investors remain relatively uninformed
compared to those cases where an announcement is published in the Wall Street Journal. The
SEC requires reporting of major lawsuits in quarterly and annual filings, but lawsuits will be
reported separately only if they materially affect the profits of the firm. For a handful of suits, we
checked published sources and typically found no mention of the suit. For this reason, estimates
for the non-Journal sample should be interpreted as lower bound estimates of defendant firms’
loss of wealth—significant numbers of investors likely became informed about the suit either
after our event window or, if there were pre-filing interactions, before.
Second, patentee litigants/plaintiffs appear to suffer some losses as well. These losses are
smaller than those for alleged infringers/defendants, but they are statistically significant.16 This is
16 It might seem puzzling that the average market response when a patent holder files a lawsuit is negative. Individual

rationality implies the patent holder only files lawsuits that have positive expected value. If this is the only relevant
information, then plaintiff CARs should be positive. As we explain in more detail in section 4.2, the event of filing may
reveal information to investors about more than just the lawsuit. Filing might reveal private information that the patent
holder’s patent is stronger than investors believed, or that the patent holder has better technology or better entry
prospects than investors believed. These possibilities provide additional reasons that the patent holder’s share value
should rise with the filing of a lawsuit. In contrast, filing might reveal private information of patent weakness, or that a
tacit industry agreement not to file patent lawsuits has broken down. These possibilities suggest share value should fall
upon lawsuit filing. Thus, a negative CAR might be explained as follows: When a pharmaceutical firm files a patent
suit investors perceive the suit has positive expected value, but they also perceive that a key patent was not as strong as
they thought and did not deter entry by a potential competitor. Alternatively, when a semiconductor firm files a patent
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consistent with previous research and it indicates that lawsuits do not represent simple transfers
of wealth on average. Instead, there is dissipation of wealth to consumers, to rivals or to
deadweight loss.
Finally, the magnitudes of returns for definite infringement suits are generally larger than
for those of all suits and they show a higher level of statistical significance. This may be because
among those cases where we could not match the patent to one of the parties, some plaintiffs are
mistakenly classified as defendants and vice versa. Or it could be because declaratory actions
may be more likely when the stakes at issue are smaller.
The bottom of Table 3 reports results for our large sample. The CARs for alleged
infringers are similar to those obtained from the smaller sample—a loss of 0.5% to 0.6%—but
here they have statistical significance at the 1% level, except for those lawsuits involving
multiple defendants.
When multiple defendants are involved the returns are negligible, suggesting that
something is fundamentally different about these estimates. There are several possible
explanations for this. It may be that suits naming multiple defendants are more frivolous, so that
investors do not expect serious losses. Alternatively, some defendants may have been
contractually indemnified, diluting the estimates. A higher percentage of defendants in lawsuits
with multiple defendants come from retail and wholesale industries, suggesting that these suits
more frequently involve downstream resellers who have less at stake. Costs may be shared
among multiple defendants, reducing the individual firm costs.
The estimates in the lower portion of the table do not control for possibly confounding
events. However, we find that excluding observations with possibly confounding events does not
seem to substantially alter the mean estimated CARs in the top portion of the table (the matched
parties sample). To check this further, we repeated the estimates for the large sample of all
alleged infringers, but we terminated the pre-event window 30 days prior to the filing of the
lawsuit. This made little difference in our estimates, suggesting that confounding events may add
noise, but do not bias our estimates.17
Figure 2 shows histograms for the cumulative abnormal returns for all lawsuits from the
matched sample. The curve for alleged infringers/defendants clearly falls to the left of the curve
for patentee litigants/plaintiffs, but both curves are quite diffuse. The distributions are
suit investors perceive the suit has positive expected value, but they also perceive the patent holder plans to exit the
industry or has become less forward-looking for some reason, and therefore, the firm is willing to deviate from a nolawsuit equilibrium. Further research is required to resolve this puzzle.
17 For example, the estimate for single defendants was 0.608% (0.176%) for the full 200 day pre-event window and
0.609% (0.178%) for the truncated window.
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significantly leptokurtic (kurtosis of 7.2 and 9.7 for plaintiffs and defendants, respectively),
meaning that they have long tails. This suggests that outliers may be influential. To make sure
that our results are not driven by outliers, we also conducted non-parametric tests (the binomial
probability test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test) on the large sample and several sub-samples.
All of these tests rejected the null hypothesis of a CAR of zero at either the 5% or the 1% level
of statistical significance. In addition, the close correspondence between the means and the
medians suggests that our mean estimates for alleged infringers are representative.

3.2 Factors affecting Abnormal Returns
Tables 4 and 5 explore factors that might influence the magnitude of investors’ reactions
to lawsuit filings by comparing means of different sub-groups. We test differences in the means
of different sub-groups using one-tailed t-tests, allowing unequal variances between the subgroups and calculating the degrees of freedom using Satterthwaite’s approximation (1946). We
conduct these comparisons both for the subject firm’s characteristics as well as characteristics of
its opposing party in the lawsuit. We also ran regressions with various combinations of the
variables in Table 4 (or continuous equivalents) on the right hand side. However, given the
noisiness of our data, little conclusive could be drawn from these regressions and where
significant results were found, they matched the results found with simple t-test comparisons of
means.
For patentee litigants, we find that firms with high liabilities relative to assets (and to a
lesser extent, firms with high current liabilities to current assets) have much more negative
returns from initiating lawsuits. One explanation is provided by Haslem (2005), who observes
that lawsuit settlements, including patent settlements, are associated with a decline in firm value,
on average. Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), he argues that poorly governed firms will
tend to settle lawsuits too soon (from the perspective of shareholders) because that allows
managers to expend less effort. Firms with low debt have more leeway for managerial discretion.
He finds that these firms experience greater declines in value on settlement. By similar logic,
firms with low debt may have more discretion about which lawsuits to file. Therefore, they may
choose to file just the most profitable lawsuits while managers in more debt-laden companies
may be driven to file more marginal lawsuits, leading to relatively lower CARs.
Another explanation might arise if some industries have a “mutual forbearance” repeated
game type equilibrium—firms mutually avoid suing each other because they recognize that if

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=983736

15 – Patent Litigation Costs - Bessen & Meurer – 2/08
they initiate a suit, they may be punished in the future with retaliatory suits. However, a failing
firm may have limited future prospects, hence little to fear from future retaliation. So failing
firms, which have high liabilities, may be more likely to initiate suits, including less profitable
suits.
For alleged infringers, we find five statistically significant differences. First, if the
parties to the lawsuit are in different industries, then the alleged infringer suffers a substantially
larger loss, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Suits from outside the industry may
be more of a surprise to investors and may be more indicative of inadvertent infringement.
Alternatively, when disputes occur within a narrow industry, the parties may have greater
latitude to craft a settlement that benefits both jointly, including, perhaps, collusive settlements.
Second, if the patentee litigant is a newly public firm, the alleged infringer makes out
better. This might be because newly public firms are less able to pursue sustained litigation,
posing less of a threat to the alleged infringer. Or, perhaps, a suit by an entrant firm provides a
signal that the technology may be more profitable than investors previously realized (see the
discussion of signaling below).
The remaining three differences from the large sample, shown in Table 5, are statistically
significant at the 5% level. First, small firms seem to have substantially more negative returns.
This result appears robust to alternative cutoff points below 500 employees, but we found no
significant variation in returns among firms larger than that. One explanation for this is that legal
costs are relatively higher for small firms, creating a “floor” on the costs of litigation. Second, we
find limited evidence that R&D intense firms suffer more negative returns, however, this result
seems sensitive to the specific cutoff used. Finally, we also find some evidence that returns were
worse during the 1990s compared to the 1980s. Note that the lower returns for alleged infringers
do not appear to be matched by greater returns to patentee litigants (top of the table). In other
words, this evidence of greater losses does not suggest a greater transfer of wealth to patent
holders.
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4 The Costs of Patent Litigation
4.1 Legal Costs
We first look at attorneys’ fees in patent litigation using supplemental data we collected
from legal records. We then estimate the total costs of litigation to alleged infringers based on
our event study estimates.
Public documents in certain U.S. patent lawsuits record attorneys’ fees because
American patent law gives judges the discretion to shift fees in exceptional cases. Patentees
usually get fee awards based on a finding of willful infringement, and alleged infringers usually
get fee awards based on a finding the patent suit was frivolous or vexatious. We searched
Westlaw for all patent cases from 1985-2004 that discussed fee-shifting. We found 352 cases in
which one of the parties requested fees (about 100 patent cases go to trial per year). The request
was granted in 137 (or 38.9%) of these cases. From this set of 137 cases we were able to
determine the magnitude of the fees in 87 cases (63.5% of awards) from judicial opinions or
from documents filed by the parties available through the PACER system.
Table 6 shows the median and mean amounts of the fee awards in millions of year 1992
dollars. Mean fees for cases that went through trial ranged were $1.04 million for patentee
litigants and $2.46 million for alleged infringers. For cases that were decided prior to trial, the
mean fees were $0.95 million for patentee litigants and $0.57 million for alleged infringers.18
Median values tend to be smaller because the distribution is skewed. In the most extreme case, a
$26 million fee was awarded to Bristol-Myers Squibb in conjunction with a successful defense
against a pharmaceutical patent suit brought by Rhone-Poulenc. The next largest award was
about $7 million.
Our fee-shifting data is in line with survey information collected by the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA). AIPLA asked patent litigators to estimate the
fees associated with patent lawsuits under six different scenarios. Specifically, the survey
question divided cases into three different intervals based on stakes, and asked for estimates for
cases that concluded at the end of discovery, and cases that reached trial. Their 2001 report
indicates the estimated cost through trial was $499,000 when the stakes are less than $1 million,
$1.499 million when the stakes are between $1 million and $25 million, and $2.992 million when

18 We included cases that ended in summary judgments, one case that settled, one case that was a default judgment,
and one case that ended in a motion to dismiss.
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the stakes are over $25 million.19 The estimated cost through discovery was $250,000 when the
stakes are less than $1 million, $797,000 when the stakes are between $1 million and $25
million, and $1.508 million when the stakes are over $25 million.20
The expected legal cost associated with the filing of a patent lawsuit depends on the
frequency of the different ways a lawsuit may be terminated. Kesan and Ball (2005) analyze
patent lawsuit termination data available from the Administrative Office of the federal judiciary.
Examining 5,207 lawsuits that were filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000, they find that most cases
terminate short of trial, summary judgment, or other substantive court rulings. In particular, 4.6%
of lawsuits reached trial, 8.5% of lawsuits terminated with a summary judgment, dismissal with
prejudice, or confirmation of an arbitration decision, and the remaining 86.9% of cases
terminated earlier in the process.
Kesan and Ball construct two proxies for legal fees in patent lawsuits: number of days
until the suit terminates, and number of documents filed. Their data show that suits that go to
trial last about 1.5 times as many days as suits that end with a summary judgment, and suits that
end with a summary judgment last about 1.5 times as many days as all other suits. Further, their
data shows that suits that go to trial generate about 2.5 times as many documents as suits that end
with a summary judgment, and suits that end with a summary judgment generate about 2.5 times
as many documents as all other suits.21 If we assume that the expected legal cost in a suit that
ends before summary judgment is one-half of the cost of suit that reaches summary judgment,
then using our data in Table 6 we have estimates of $410,000 for the alleged infringer, and
$624,000 for the patentee. A similar calculation using AIPLA data for stakes between $1 million
and $25 million yields an estimate of $483,000.

4.2 Firm value and patent lawsuits
Using our CAR estimates, we can calculate the loss of wealth that occurs upon a lawsuit
filing. From this, we can then infer a cost to alleged infringers. Multiplying the estimated CAR
for each firm by the value of its outstanding shares of common stock immediately prior to the
lawsuit filing, we obtain a mean loss of wealth in 1992 dollars of $83.7 million. This is an

19 These amounts increased substantially in the 2003 and 2005 AIPLA reports.
20 The AIPLA estimate of costs through discovery should be larger than the fees shifted at the summary judgment
stage to the extent that discovery continues after summary judgment.
21 We derive these ratios from their Tables 10-12.
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unbiased estimate of the mean loss of wealth, however, it is not the most efficient estimate. We
can do better by multiplying the mean CAR by each firm’s capitalization.22
Using means for three categories (suits with multiple defendants, those with single
defendants with more than 500 employees and those with single defendants with 500 or fewer
employees), we obtain a mean estimated loss of $52.4 million in 1992 dollars and a median loss
of $4.5 million.23 These estimates are somewhat smaller than Lerner’s estimate for biotech
companies of a mean loss of $67.9 million and a median loss of $20.0 million.
This loss of wealth corresponds to the associated drop in investors’ expected profits. But
does this loss of wealth correspond to the cost of litigation? There are two reasons why it might
not. First, the filing of a lawsuit might reveal information that causes investors to revalue the
firm for reasons other than the direct and indirect costs of litigation. We explore these
possibilities in this section. In the next section, we consider how much investment the firm must
undertake in order to restore its investors’ wealth—this might not equal the loss of wealth itself.
News of a lawsuit causes investors to re-evaluate their expectations of the discounted
profit flow expected from the defendant firm for several different reasons. We assume that the
Efficient Market Hypothesis holds, implying that investors incorporate all publicly available
information into their valuation of the firm. Consider defendant firm i at time t = 0, before the
lawsuit filing, and at t = 1, immediately after the news of the filing has been made public. At
t = 0, investors’ expected value of the firm based on publicly available information, V, is

Vi 0

i

0

pi 0 C

(3)

where π represents the discounted expected profits of the firm (excluding litigation), p is the
expected number of times the firm will be sued for patent infringement and C is the total
expected cost to the firm of a patent lawsuit. This expected cost of litigation includes:
Legal costs.
N

1
22 The first estimator is N

r

ei xi

1

where N is the number of firms, r is the true CAR, e is the error in
measuring the ith firm’s CAR, and x is the ith firm’s market capitalization. The second estimator is
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. It is straightforward to show that both are unbiased but that the latter has smaller variance
assuming that e and x are uncorrelated.
i

23 Specifically, we multiply the common stock capitalization by .00012 for firms in cases with multiple defendants, by
.00564 for single defendants with more than 500 employees, and by .0208 for small single defendants.
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Indirect costs, such as management distraction, loss of market share during the lawsuit,
and loss of lead-time advantage.
Financial costs arising from greater risk, including risk of bankruptcy. These include
possibly higher costs of funds and also the loss of wealth associated with a higher riskadjusted discount rate applied to the stream of future expected profits.24
Costs of expected outcomes including those associated with a settlement agreement and
trial outcome. Investors take expectations over all possible outcomes and also over the
length of time and cost incurred before outcomes are reached.
Then at time t = 1,

Vi 1

i

1

pi 1 C

(4)

C

Comparing (2) and (1) and taking expectations over all lawsuits, the mean CAR should
equal

E V

E

E p C

C

(5)

The first term represents the change in investors’ expectations about the future profit
stream based on new information made public by the lawsuit filing. The second term in (5)
represents investors’ re-assessment of the risk of future litigation. This occurs if the lawsuit
provides information that the firm is somehow more prone to litigation than originally expected.
Clearly, if the sum of the first two terms is non-zero, then the change in firm value provides a
biased estimate of the cost of litigation.
There are two sources of information from the filing that might affect these two terms:
1. Information revealed by the filing documents themselves (and any associated press
releases, etc.), and,
2. any information revealed by the event as a signal of the patentee’s beliefs. For
example, because litigation is costly, the lawsuit may signal that the patent holder
believes that the opportunity at stake is particularly valuable—otherwise the suit might
not be worth the cost. Note that the documents may reinforce this signal, e.g., the
claim for damages may also be large, but with a signal the claim may become credible.
24 Implying that π includes the discounted profit stream evaluated at the original discount rate. This interpretation is
consistent with our definition of the cost of litigation being the level of investment necessary to restore the wealth of
the firms’ investors to the level just prior to the lawsuit.
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In order for either source to cause investors to revalue the firm, the lawsuit filing must
somehow reveal information that was not previously public knowledge—under the Efficient
Market Hypothesis we assume that investors correctly incorporate all public knowledge. In other
words, the patent holder or the defendant firm must have some private knowledge that is
revealed in the filing documents or by the signal generated by the filing.
Therefore, if the first two terms in (5) are to affect the mean CAR substantially, there
must be a systematic reason for the patent holder or the alleged infringer to have private
information that is revealed by the lawsuit filing. The documents in the lawsuit filing typically
reveal relatively little hard information other than the fact of the filing, often exaggerated claims
of damages, and possible allegations of bad behavior by the defendant (something we discuss
below). The patents themselves, of course, are necessarily public information before the suit is
filed. But we can identify three reasons why the parties might have private information that is
revealed by the filing:
1. Private information about the quality of the technology. For well-known reasons,
managers have private information about the quality of their technology. A lawsuit
may signal that the patent holder knows that the defendant’s technology is of better
quality than investors previously realized, hence the market potential is greater, hence
a lawsuit may be more profitable. Note that in this case, E[∆π] > 0.
2. Private information about entry plans. If a patent holder plans on entering the
defendant firm’s market, then the lawsuit might reveal this knowledge, causing
investors to revalue the defendant firm downwards because they expect greater
competition for the firm. Note that in order for this factor to substantially affect our
average CARs, such prospective entrants must initiate a substantial number of patent
lawsuits. Also, the prospective entrants cannot have revealed any information about
their entry plans prior to filing the lawsuit. This strikes us as a rather odd business
strategy—one would think a superior strategy would be to enter the market before
filing a lawsuit so as to capture market share from those customers who want to avoid
the defendant firm. Nevertheless, we will look at empirical evidence regarding this
story below. In this case, E[∆π] < 0.
3. Private information about managerial quality or level of effort. For well-known
reasons, managers keep private information about their abilities and about the level of
effort that they exert. Lawsuits might tend to indicate that managers at the defendant
firm were not sufficiently diligent in clearing patent rights or, worse, that they copied
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technology rather than developing their own. If this tends to be true and if managers
tend not to correct their behavior following a lawsuit, then investors might revalue
future profits downwards. This occurs both because investors might expect more
patent litigation in the future (the second term of (5)) and because poor managerial
quality might also reduce profits generally (the first term in (5)).
Several empirical observations lead us to discount the second and third explanations,
however. If lawsuit filings revealed news about previously unknown entrants, we might expect
this to be particularly true for plaintiffs that had recently gone public. These plaintiffs might not
be widely known and therefore, on average, defendant firms might lose greater value when sued
by newly public firms. However, we find that defendants’ CARs are significantly more positive
when the plaintiff is a newly public firm (see Table 4).25
In addition, if news about entry is a significant factor affecting average CARs, then we
would expect to find that a significant portion of plaintiffs were: a.) not known as market rivals
to the defendant firm prior to the lawsuit, but, b.) became market rivals subsequently. Using
Compustat’s market segment data, we found that this fact pattern is actually rather uncommon.
Compustat reports SIC codes for each firm’s major market segments. Of the plaintiffs who had
no market segments in common with defendants prior to the lawsuit, we found that only 5%
entered a market segment in common with the defendant during the three years following the
lawsuit filing.26 Thus it seems unlikely that a substantial part of defendants’ CARs can be
explained by revelation of previously unknown entrants.
Other evidence leads us to discount the significance of any news about managerial
quality or effort revealed by the lawsuit. Managerial quality is less likely to be of significance in
lawsuits that are filed the same year that the patent is granted—often these patents contain claims
that were not previously publicly known, so there is less that managers could have done to avoid
infringement and managerial quality is less of an issue. For this reason, lawsuits on these patents
cannot reveal as much about managerial quality. If revelations about managerial quality explain a
large portion of the defendants’ CARs, we would expect the CARs to be more positive for
25 The increase could be because startup firms are less able to pursue sustained litigation and therefore a lawsuit from a
startup poses less of a threat. Alternatively, a lawsuit by an entrant may indicate that the technological opportunity is
greater than investors previously realized.
26 This figure compares SIC market segments at the 4 digit level. A comparable calculation using 3-digit industry
classifications finds a 6% entry rate. This comparison only concerns major market segments, so some entry is
unrecorded in minor segments, however, rivalry in minor market segments is only likely to have a minor effect on firm
value.
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patents issued the same year as the lawsuit. In fact, we find that the CARs are more negative for
these patents, although the difference is not statistically significant.
Also, we would expect that the managerial quality explanation is much more significant
the first time a firm is sued. That is, if a lawsuit reveals significant information about managerial
quality, we would expect the second lawsuit to reveal less, and the fifth or tenth lawsuit to reveal
even less. We would expect investors to learn and, for this reason, we would expect that, on
average, CARs would reflect less revelation of information about managerial quality for, say, the
fourth through tenth lawsuit than for the first three.27 We compared defendant CARs depending
on the number of lawsuits the firm had in our sample or on the sequence of the lawsuit. We
found no significant differences between CARs for a wide range of different comparisons. E.g.,
firms with only one lawsuit in our sample had CARs that were on average only .0008 (standard
deviation of .0047) less than the CARs for firms sued multiple times. Thus revelations about
managerial quality do not seem to explain much of the average loss in firm value from the filing
of a lawsuit.
We have little empirical evidence bearing on the role of revelations about technological
quality other than anecdote.28 In Table 4, we saw that defendants do better when the lawsuit is
filed by a newly public firm. One explanation is that suits by newly public firms reveal
information about technological quality, but this is not the only possible explanation. However,
as we noted above, for revelation about technological quality, E[∆π] > 0. Given this, we conclude
that E[∆π] ≥ 0 and E[∆p] ≈ 0, so that C ≥ −E[∆V]. That is, the cost of litigation is likely at least
as large as the loss in firm market value.

4.3 Investment level costs
If we want to know how much litigation “taxes” investment in innovation, then we need
to calculate something other than the loss of wealth. That is, we define the “cost of litigation” as
the amount that the firm has to invest in order to increase its value to the level it had just prior to
the lawsuit, all else equal. This does not necessarily equal the amount of wealth the firm loses
because firms are not necessarily operating at the long-run steady state. They may, instead, be
undergoing dynamic adjustment. Then changes in investment will be larger or smaller than the
associated changes in firm value. In particular, assuming constant returns to scale, an additional
investment of one dollar should increase firm value by an amount equal to Tobin’s Q.
27 This assumes, of course, that management is not entirely replaced between lawsuits.
28 A tech industry joke on hearing that someone has been sued is, “Congratulations, you must be doing something
right!”
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Following this logic, to calculate the cost of litigation, we divide the estimated loss of
wealth by Tobin’s Q.29 This gives us a mean cost of litigation to alleged infringers of $28.7
million and a median cost of $2.9 million in 1992 dollars.
These estimates are clearly much larger than the estimates of direct legal costs. Most of
the cost of litigation to firms appears to arise from expected settlement payments and business
costs such as loss of market share, management distraction, and increased financial costs from
greater risk. These costs are incurred even if the suit does not proceed to trial, as happens most
often.
It is interesting to compare our estimate to data from cases that proceed to trial. For the
small number of reported cases that go to trial, are won by the patentee, and which award
damages to the patentee, we can compare the magnitude of these damages. Mean reported
lawsuit damages from 1991-2005 are $10.7 million in 1992 dollars.30 This number does not
include the business cost of the injunction to the infringer, which is often much larger than the
damages. For example, the court found damages of $53.7 million in NTP v. RIM, but because of
the injunction, NTP eventually settled for $612 million. This mean also does not include the
costs of pursuing the litigation, both direct payment of legal costs and indirect business costs.
Nevertheless, it is reassuring that this figure is of the same order of magnitude as our mean
estimate.

5 The Risk of Infringement for Public Firms
These cost estimates can be summed over all the observed lawsuit filings to obtain
measures of firm risk. Table 7 shows three related measures.
The first column lists the annual cost of litigation obtained by summing the cost over all
the events in our large sample in each year of the sample. During 1996-99, this averaged $14.9
billion in 1992 dollars. This number is large compared to estimates of patent value. Bessen
(2008), using renewal data to estimate patent value, reports the aggregate value of patents issued
to all US patentees (not just public firms) in 1991was about $4.4 billion.
Moreover, this figure has varied considerably over time, increasing dramatically from
$2.0 billion in 1984 to $16.1 billion in 1999. Figure 3 shows the annual time series. The rise
began in the early 1990s and closely follows the increasing frequency of litigation (Bessen and
29 We calculate Tobin’s Q as the aggregate value of firms divided by the inflation-adjusted value of the aggregate sum
of accounting assets and R&D. For details on the computation of these quantities, see Bessen (2006b).
30 This figure is the mean of deflated annual means reported in Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2006).
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Meurer 2005). But other factors contributed as well, including the increase in R&D spending and
firm capitalization. Below we look at infringement risk normalized by R&D. The absolute cost of
litigation was borne almost entirely by large firms and nearly half by firms in the computer,
electronics and software industries.
Note that this series may be substantially understated because, as is well-known, the
Derwent Litalert data under-report lawsuits (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004, Bessen and
Meurer 2005). In our 2005 working paper using this sample, we find that only about 64% of
lawsuits are reported in Derwent. We have left the first column uncorrected, since it reports a
simple sum for our sample. However, the second and third columns compare litigation cost to
numbers of firms and to R&D spending, respectively, so to make the appropriate comparisons,
we correct these for under-reporting by dividing by 0.64.31
On the other hand, this series may slightly overstate the aggregate cost of patent
litigation per se because some of the suits listed involved more than just charges of patent
infringement and validity. For example, sometimes patent owners will combine allegations of
patent infringement with allegations that other rights (including other intellectual property rights)
have been violated. Some of the suits of this sort might occur even if there were no patent
infringement at issue, so it might not be appropriate to include all of the costs associated with
these suits in an aggregate estimate of patent litigation costs. However, for two reasons we do not
think this is a serious problem. First, searching published court decisions between 1991 and
1999, only 11% of patent infringement and validity suits also involved claims involving trade
secrets, trademarks, copyright, false advertising, unfair competition or noncompete clauses.32
Second, in Table 4 we observed that the alleged infringer’s losses are much greater for interindustry suits than for intra-industry suits. Since most of the cases involving these additional
legal issues occur between rivals in the same industries, these suits do not contribute much to
aggregate litigation costs. So it seems unlikely that our aggregate cost estimates overstate the
costs of patent litigation by more than a few percent.
The second column displays the annual firm infringement risk. This is the mean expected
cost of litigation for a firm from patent infringement lawsuits (or related declaratory actions). It
averaged $4.5 million during 1996-99 and it shows a similar pattern of distribution.

31 Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) found no significant differences between the characteristics of the reported and
unreported lawsuits.
32 Based on a search of case synopses in the Westlaw FIP-CS database.
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The third column shows the ratio of annual litigation cost to annual aggregate R&D. This
averaged 14.0% during 1996-99. This relative rate also increased from 1984 to 1999, more than
tripling to 19.3% (roughly in line with the growth of the litigation hazard), but this increase was
not as rapid as for the quantity in column 1. Note that relative to R&D, litigation risk is low for
small firms and for firms outside of the chemical, pharmaceutical and tech industries.
It is tempting to compare this ratio with the “equivalent subsidy rate” for patents, that is,
the aggregate value of patents divided by the value of the corresponding R&D. Schankerman
(1998) suggests that this ratio represents an upper bound on the subsidy that patents provide to
invest in innovation. But, as we argued above, this is clearly a gross subsidy that can be offset by
litigation risk if innovators risk inadvertent infringement and by other costs. Several papers
calculate this ratio by comparing the value of a nation’s patents (estimated using patent renewal
data) to R&D (calculated by allocating national R&D spending to the patents obtained in the
subject country). Lanjouw et al. (1998) review this literature and report that most subsidy rates
are on the order of 10-15%. Arora et al. (2005), use survey data to obtain a comparable estimate
of 17%.
However, these numbers are not directly comparable to our estimates of relative
litigation risk for at least three reasons. First, because of the way these studies allocate global
R&D, they effectively report the subsidy provided by worldwide patents, not patents in a single
country.33 However, the litigation cost is only for US litigation and does not include the costs of
litigation in other countries nor the costs of other dispute resolution such as opposition
proceedings. An “apples-to-apples” comparison would include these costs as well.
Second, the subsidy rate calculations based on patent value use the value of all of the
nation’s patents, including patents from individual inventors and small firms. The litigation risk
estimates are only for public firms; these are the firms that conduct the lion’s share of R&D. A
more appropriate comparison would calculate subsidy rates using patents values only for public
firms (see Bessen 2008 for comparable figures). In any case, public firms may experience both
different subsidy rates and different litigation costs than other firms.
Finally, the litigation costs are estimated for the current year, but the value of patents
granted reflects a stream of profits in future years. Ideally, we would want to compare litigation
33 That is, using trade data, they allocate a share of the R&D performed in every OECD country to, say, French patents
when they calculate the subsidy rate using the value of French patents. The apparent assumption behind this allocation
is that subsidy rates are the same across nations and that the share of trade is proportional to each nation’s share of
worldwide patent value. Then the calculated subsidy rate will represent the return from worldwide patents. Similarly,
Arora et al. use US patents as a right hand variable, but this proxies for each firm’s worldwide patents.
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costs to the profits from patents on the same cohort of technologies that were litigated. Some of
these profits are realized prior to the time of litigation. Since both litigation costs and patent
values are trending up, this use of current patent values understates the significance of litigation
costs.
All three of these considerations suggest that a direct comparison of reported subsidy
rates to US litigation risk overstates the relative positive value of patents. At the very least, these
estimates suggest that litigation risk is quite large compared to the private benefits of patents,
especially in recent years.

6 Conclusion
Using a large set of event studies, we estimate the total cost that patent litigation imposes
on firms and we estimate the risk of infringement litigation. We find that, contrary to what is
sometimes assumed, the business costs of litigation far exceed the direct legal costs. And we find
that by the late 1990s, patent litigation risk was of the same order as, if not larger than, estimates
of the private benefits firms receive from patents. Moreover, consistent with the previous
literature, the losses to alleged infringers do not correspond to a transfer of wealth to patent
holders; instead there is a substantial joint loss of wealth. Our estimates concern private costs
rather than the social costs of litigation, nevertheless these estimates tell us something about the
effectiveness of patents as a policy tool to encourage investment in innovation.
In the best case, this suggests that the patent system is at present an inefficient form of
subsidy or regulation. Thomas Hopkins estimates the total 1992 cost of general regulatory
compliance is $389,911 per firm (in 1995 dollars).34 But the costs of complying with the patent
system—annual infringement risk of $4.5 million—are much larger.
In the worst case, the net effect of patents today may be to reduce the profits of public
firms and to possibly impose disincentives on innovative activity as well. Exploration of the
possible causes and the significance of this for policy and for normative analysis are beyond the
scope of this paper, however. Nevertheless, our analysis indicates that infringement risk should
be an important consideration in the formulation of patent policy.

34 Thomas D. Hopkins The Changing Burden of Regulation, Paperwork, and Tax Compliance on Small Business,
http://www.sba.gov/gopher/Legislation-And-Regulations/Burden/burd7.txt
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Summary Statistics

Matched Sample

All Alleged
Infringers

Patentee Litigants

Alleged Infringers

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

7,020.4

1,267.7

6,186.7

1,022.7

8,604.0

1,368.1

Employees (1000s)

40.2

9.2

36.1

6.7

46.3

9.3

R&D / Sales

9.4%

5.4%

18.9%

5.3%

13.9%

5.0%

No R&D reported

6.1%

9.0%

18.4%

No. observations

771

720

2887

Sales ($ million)
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Table 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns from Suits Announced in Wall Street Journal,
1984-99
Event window

WSJ article

Suit filing

T-2 to T+1

T-1 to T+24

Bhagat et al.
(1998)

mean

-0.3%

-0.1%

-0.31%

median

0.0%

0.9%

86

86

mean

-2.6%

-1.8%

median

-1.4%

-1.9%

82

82

mean

-2.6%

-2.5%

median

-1.8%

-0.5%

80

80

Patentee Litigant (Plaintiff)

no. of observations
Alleged Infringer (Defendant)

no. of observations

-1.50%

Combined (matched parties)

no. of observations

Addendum: mean combined abnormal returns
Bhagat et al. (1994)

-3.13%

Lerner (1995)

-2.0%

Note: Events with possibly confounding news are excluded. Average cumulative abnormal
returns are simple unweighted means.
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Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Mean CAR

Median CAR Robust Z Observations
Statistic

Sample: Matched Parties
Patentee Litigants
Base

-0.38% (0.30%)

0.00%

-1.51

667

Definite infringement suits

-0.63% (0.37%)*

-0.45%

-2.18*

412

Base

-0.62% (0.33%)*

-0.97%

-1.55

661

Definite infringement suits

-0.77% (0.42%)*

-0.83%

-1.70*

407

With possibly confounding
events

-0.45% (0.31%)

-0.57%

-1.32

743

Base

-0.50% (0.16%)**

-0.51%

-3.24**

2,887

Single defendants

-0.61% (0.18%)**

-0.54%

-2.94**

2,460

Multiple defendants

-0.01% (0.39%)

-0.39%

-1.38

-0.63% (0.27%)**

-0.42%

-2.37**

Alleged Infringers

Sample: All alleged infringers

Single defendants, definite
infringement cases

427
1,108

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Single asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level; double asterisk indicates 1% significance. Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
are weighted means, with weights proportional to the inverse of the estimated variance of each
return. In matched sample, events with possibly confounding news are excluded, except where
noted. Event window is 25 days (T-1 to T+24). Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using
OLS except for cases with multiple defendants (in large sample), which are estimated jointly.
The robust Z statistic is a joint test of the individual firm t statistics (Kramer 2001).
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Table 4. Differences in Mean CARs by Characteristics
Sample: Matched Parties
Alleged Infringer

Patentee Litigant

Firm characteristic
Employees < 500

-3.20% (2.32%)

-3.18% (2.45%)

R&D / Sales > .15

0.22% (2.16%)

-0.53% (1.22%)

Total liabilities / Total Assets > .5

1.40% (0.87%)

-2.35% (0.75%)**

Capital / Employee > $100,000

-0.02% (0.93%)

-1.02% (0.74%)

0.94% (1.00%)

-1.91% (0.87%)*

-0.94% (1.78%)

-1.92% (2.56%)

Employees < 500

1.06% (1.19%)

-1.37% (1.07%)

R&D / Sales > .15

0.23% (1.62%)

0.81% (0.97%)

Total liabilities / Total Assets > .5

-0.15% (0.86%)

-0.35% (0.80%)

Capital / Employee > $100,000

-0.99% (0.95%)

1.02% (0.74%)

Current Assets / current liabilities < 1.5

1.69% (1.11%)

1.19% (0.86%)

Newly public firm

3.77% (1.51%)**

0.32% (1.05%)

Current Assets / current liabilities < 1.5
Newly public firm
Rival characteristic

Other Characteristics
Year > 1989

-0.15% (0.82%)

Firms in same SIC4 primary industry

2.67% (1.16%)**

0.09% (0.77)%
-0.11% (0.78%)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Single asterisk indicates difference is statistically
significant at the 5% level; double asterisk indicates 1% significance (one-tailed test allowing
unequal variances and using Satterthwaite’s calculation for degrees of freedom). Average
cumulative abnormal returns are weighted means, with weights proportional to the inverse of the
estimated variance of each return. Comparisons are for cases where infringement is known and
no possibly confounding events have been found.
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Table 5. Differences in Mean CARs by Firm Characteristics
Sample: All alleged infringers
Employees < 500

-1.70% (0.92%)*

R&D / Sales > .15

-1.79% (0.80%)*

Total liabilities / Total Assets > .5
Capital / Employee > $100,000
Current Assets / current liabilities < 1.5

0.05% (0.33%)
-0.26% (0.44%)
0.11% (0.34%)

Year > 1989

-0.56% (0.32%)*

Patentee is public firm

-0.12% (0.35%)

Industry
SIC = 28 (chemicals, inc. pharma)

-0.41% (0.41%)

SIC = 35,36,73 (electronics, computer,sw)

0.06% (0.38%)

Other manufacturing

0.16% (0.33%)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Single asterisk indicates difference is statistically
significant at the 5% level; double asterisk indicates 1% significance (one-tailed test allowing
unequal variances and using Satterthwaite’s calculation for degrees of freedom). Average
cumulative abnormal returns are weighted means, with weights proportional to the inverse of the
estimated variance of each return.
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Table 6. Attorneys'Fees Awarded in Patent Lawsuits (in millions of year 1992 dollars)

Mean

Median

Observations

Summary Judgment

.95

.40

8

Verdict

1.04

.78

51

Summary Judgment

.57

.30

10

Verdict

2.46

.98

18

Patentee Litigant

Alleged Infringer
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Table 7. Measures of Infringement Risk, Public Firms
Aggregate Annual
Cost of Litigation to
Alleged Infringers
(billion $92)

Annual Firm
Infringement
Risk
(million $92)

Aggregate Risk /
R&D

1984

2.0

1.3

4.9%

1999

16.1

7.0

19.3%

All firms

14.9

4.5

14.0%

Small firms (employees <500)

0.1

0.1

1.3%

Large firms
(employees>=500)

14.8

9.8

14.9%

SIC = 28 (chemicals, inc.
pharma)

3.4

9.7

14.1%

SIC = 35,36,73 (electronics,
computer, software)

6.8

5.7

14.8%

Other manufacturing

1.7

2.3

5.3%

1996 - 99

Note: Annual cost of litigation is the mean CAR times the market capitalization of each firm’s common
stock divided by a GDP deflator and by the aggregate Tobin’s Q (market value divided by replacement
value of capital including R&D). Firm infringement risk is the expected annual cost of litigation. Column 1
includes all events in the large sample (2,887) with separate means for small firms and lawsuits with
multiple defendants. Columns 2 and 3 have been adjusted for under-reporting of lawsuits (see Lanjouw and
Schankerman 2004 and Bessen and Meurer 2005).
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Figure 1. Frequency of Wall Street Journal Stories Relative to Court Filing Date
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Figure 2. Histograms of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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Figure 3. Aggregate annual cost of patent litigation to alleged infringers
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8 Appendix
This appendix explores further our choice of a window around the lawsuit filing date
rather than an announcement in a newspaper or wire service. First, we explore whether a sample
based on Wall Street Journal articles is likely to suffer sample selection bias. Table A1 shows
Probit regressions on whether a lawsuit in our matched sample received mention in the Wall
Street Journal. The patentee litigant’s capital intensity and the alleged infringer’s stock beta are
both highly significant (at the 1% level) predictors of a Wall Street Journal article. Because high
beta stocks are likely to have a larger reaction to news of a lawsuit, this suggests that samples
based on Wall Street Journal articles may have significant bias. We find, in fact, that our
estimates from our sub-sample of lawsuits announced in the Wall Street Journal do have much
more negative CARs.
Because we do not have information on whether a suit is an infringement suit or a
declaratory action in all cases, we likely mis-identify some plaintiffs and defendants, possibly
diluting our estimates for alleged infringers. One way to correct this would be to limit our sample
to cases of definite infringement, but this might also introduce a selection bias. The last two
columns of Table A1 explore characteristics that may affect whether the suit is an infringement
suit or a declaratory action. It appears that newly public patentees may be a bit more aggressive
in filing suits, while larger alleged infringers may be more likely to end up in an infringement
suit. Large firms may avoid filing declaratory actions, waiting for evidence that the patent owner
has the resources to conduct a lawsuit. Because there may be a selection bias, we report CARs
both for the entire sample and also for cases that we know are infringement suits.
Finally, as discussed in the text, because news of a lawsuit filing leaks out more slowly
than a newspaper announcement, we use a 25 day event window. Figure A1 shows the mean
CARs we would obtain using shorter event windows. Note that the unweighted mean and the
median CARs both react more sharply in the days after the filing. This is because high beta
stocks respond more quickly after the filing (they are the ones where investors may have the
greater incentive to obtain such news). Because the CARs for low beta stocks are estimated more
precisely and their response is slower, the weighted mean responds more slowly. However, all
three averages are roughly equal by the end of our 25 day window.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=983736

41 – Patent Litigation Costs - Bessen & Meurer – 2/08

Table A1. Suit Announcement and Type
Wall Street Journal Article
1

2

Infringement Suit
3

4

Plaintiff/patentee litigant
Ln employment

0.05 (.03)

.02 (.03)

.01 (.04)

New firm

-.25 (.23)

.63 (.29)

.62 (.33)

Stock Beta
Capital / employee

.13 (.12)

.15 (.11)

.20 (.13)

1.01 (.38)

1.12 (.40)

-.64 (.49)

Defendant/alleged infringer
Ln employment
New firm

-.01 (.03)

.06 (.03)

.07 (.03)

.28 (.20)

-.01 (.20)

-.05 (.22)

Stock Beta

.35 (.13)

.35 (.13)

.05 (.14)

Capital / employee

.05 (.36)

.11 (.36)

-.95 (.51)

No. of observations

637

637

507

475

Pseudo-R-squared

.049

.062

.023

.057

Note: Probit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bold estimates are significant a the 5%
level or better. Regressions include industry dummies (not shown).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=983736

42 – Patent Litigation Costs - Bessen & Meurer – 2/08
Figure A1. Average Abnormal Cumulative Returns Over Time
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